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Abstract  Many programming languages have been developed and im	
plemented for mobile code environments They are typically quite ex	
pressive But while security is an important aspect of any mobile code
technology  it is often treated after the fundamental design is complete 
in ad hoc ways In the end  it is unclear what security guarantees can
be made for the system We argue that mobile programming languages
should be designed around certain security properties that hold for all
well	formed programs This requires a better understanding of the rela	
tionship between programming language design and security Appropri	
ate security properties must be identied Some of these properties and
related issues are explored
An assortment of languages and environments have been proposed for mobile
code Some have been designed for use in executable content and others for use
in agents   Parallel e orts in extensible networks and operating systems
have also focused attention on language design for mobility These e orts include
work on active networks  	 the SPIN kernel 
  and Exokernel 	 What
these e orts have in common is a need for security
We can roughly separate security concerns in this setting into code security
and host security The former is concerned with protecting mobile code from un
trusted hosts while the latter is concerned with protecting hosts from untrusted
mobile code This may seem a bit articial since one might like to model security
more symmetrically
 
Nonetheless it is a useful distinction for now The code
security problem seems quite intractable given that mobile code is under the
control of a host For some proposals and a discussion see 
 
  In the
remainder of this paper we treat only the host security problem
  Host Security
Our view of the problem is that mobile code is executed on a host which must
be protected from privacy and integrity violations As far as privacy goes the
 
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One can imagine a model that does not distinguish mobile code from a host  treating
both as mutually suspicious parties
host has private data that the code may need to perform some expected task
The host wants assurance that it can trust the code not to leak the private
data This is the classical view of privacy 

 As for integrity the host has
information that should not be corrupted Integrity in general demands total
code correctness After all corrupt data can simply be the result of incorrect
code There are however weaker forms of integrity 
We believe that an important characteristic of the mobile code setting is
that the only observable events are those that can be observed from within a
mobile program using language primitives and any host utilities There are no
metalevel observers of a mobile programs behavior such as a person observing
its execution behavior online Still depending on the language leaks can occur
in many di erent ways some being much more dicult to detect than others
   Security Architectures
A common approach to host security is to monitor the execution of mobile
code You build an interpreter or virtual machine and slap the hands of any
code that tries to touch something sensitive The interpreter obviously needs
to know whether hand slapping is in order so it might appeal to some sort of
trust framework to decide This arrangement is often called a security archi
tecture Architectures are growing quite elaborate as the demand for less hand
slapping rises An example is the security architecture of the Java Developers
Kit JDK
  It blends some proven concepts such as protection domains
access control permissions and code signing to allow applets more room to
maneuver Netscapes Object Signing Architecture takes a similar approach
One begins to wonder how much of these security architectures is really
necessary Are they a response to a need for host security given mobile programs
written in a poorlydesigned mobile programming language Perhaps they can
be simplied It would seem that this is possible if mobile code is written in a
language that ensures certain security properties statically
For example suppose that all welltyped programs have a secure ow prop
erty and that you know a certain program needing your personal identication
number PIN is indeed well typed Then that program respects the privacy of
your PIN and there is no need to check at runtime whether the program has
permission to read it
Our claim is not that security architectures will no longer have a role in
the future We feel their role will simply change and be more formally justied
For example they might carry out certain static analyses or proof checking
perhaps along the lines of proofcarrying code 
 It should be possible for
a given language to more clearly identify the role of the security architecture
Certain desirable properties might be provable for all wellformed programs in
the language in which case some security checks can go away
There are many di erent facets of mobile language design that inuence
security in some way For example access control mechanisms encapsulation
visibility rules etc are important We will limit our attention to some of the
issues that impact host privacy and integrity On the integrity side we look at


type safety  Type safety is often said to be a key ingredient for security in Java
and for safe kernel extensions written in Modula 
 Today some languages like
Standard ML evolve with formal treatments of the type system and semantics
developed along the way This allows one to give formal accounts of type safety
that evolve as well Other languages like Java lack this sort of formal treatment
Java has grown so rapidly that one quickly loses grasp of the impact of certain
features on key properties like type safety
Then we explore the relationship between privacy and language design There
are many ways mobile code can leak secrets We start by examining information
channels in a deterministic language We look at how they are inuenced by
timing synchrony and nontermination Then we consider channels in a simple
concurrent language with shared variables Some of these channels arise in very
subtle ways For example they can arise from contention among processes for
shared resources like CPU cycles
 Type Safety
What is type safety Consider the following description from a Java perspective
The Java language itself is designed to enforce security in the form of
type safety This means the compiler ensures that methods and programs
do not access memory in ways that are inappropriate ie dangerous In
e ect this is the most essential part of the Java security model in that
it fundamentally protects the integrity of the memory map
Secure Computing with Java  Now and the Future
 JavaOne Conference
In Java for example code should not somehow be able to coerce a reference of a
userdened class to one of a system class like SecurityManager which the run
time system Java Virtual Machine consults for access permissions Obviously
this leads to trouble
So at the heart of type safety is a guarantee against misinterpretation of
datasome sequence of bits being misinterpreted by an operation This has
long been recognized as a serious computer security problem In a wellknown
report published twentyve years ago Anderson describes a way to penetrate a
timesharing system HIS GCOS III based on the ability to execute a users
array contents with an assigned GOTO statement in Fortran  The statement
can misinterpret its target the contents of an arbitrary integer variable as an
instruction Today we see the same sort of problem in a di erent context 

  Type Preservation
An important property related to type safety is the idea of type preservation
Type preservation is frequently confused with type soundness in the literature
Soundness is a statement about the progress a programs execution can make if

the program is well typed Type preservation on the other hand merely asserts
that if a welltyped program evaluates successfully then it produces a value of
the correct type It is usually needed to prove soundness For instance you may
know that an expression with some type evaluates to a value but the value
must have a specic form in order for evaluation to proceed Type preservation
gives you that the value has the same type as the expression and with some
correct forms typing lemma you know that only values of the form needed have
that type
The following is a typical type preservation theorem If   is a memory map
ping locations to values and  is a location typing mapping locations to types
then type preservation is stated as follows 
Theorem Type Preservation If     e  v  
 
    e    and     then
there exists 
 








  v   
The rst hypothesis of the theorem states that under memory   a closed expres
sion e evaluates to a value v and a memory  
 
 Now e may contain free locations
hence e is typed with respect to a location typing  which must be consistent
with   that is     Evaluation of e can produce new locations that wind up
in v so v is typed with respect to an extension 
 
of 
As one can clearly see from the theorem whether a language exhibits this
property depends on the type system and the semantics In some cases we might
expect that the type system needs to change if the property does not hold But
the semantics itself may be to blame For instance consider the C program in
Figure  When compiled and executed  c evaluates to a signed integer quantity
char  c
f char cc  a c  cc
g int i  	


main f g printfc c
Fig    Dereferencing a dangling pointer
yet it has type char If a C semantics prescribes this behavior then we cannot
prove type preservation with respect to that semantics the C language says this
program is unpredictable This is one place where type preservation and C col
lide

A formal C semantics should be clear about the outcome of dereferencing
a dangling pointer if this is considered normal execution so that type preser
vation can be proved Otherwise it should specify that execution gets stuck in
this situation again so that type preservation holds In the latter case an imple
mentation of C would be required to detect such an erroneous execution point if
that implementation were safe A safe faithful implementation guarantees that
every execution is prescribed by the semantics so that programs cannot run in

Thus  perhaps  it is not surprising that the SPIN group abandoned its attempts to
dene a safe subset of C  adopting Modula	 instead 

ways not accounted for by the semantics This usually requires that an imple
mentation do some runtime type checking unless it can be proved unnecessary
by a type soundness result
Remark Although a lack of pointer expressiveness is in general a good thing
from a safety viewpoint manifest pointers references are still a substantial
security risk A runtime system might accidentally provide an application a ref
erence to a system security object that must remain invariant This was demon
strated in Java for JDK Its entire trust framework based on digitallysigned
code was undermined when it was discovered that applications could obtain a
reference to a code signers array

 Type Soundness
Type preservation theorems usually talk about successful evaluations Their hy
potheses involve an assumption about an evaluation proceeding in some number
of steps to a canonical form But this may not adequately address a type sys
tems intentions An objective of a system might be to guarantee termination or
to ensure that programs terminate only in specied ways eg no segmentation
violations

What is needed is a precise account of how a welltyped program
can behave when executed In other words we want a type soundness theorem
that species all the possible behaviors that a welltyped program can exhibit
Traditional type soundness arguments based on showing that a welltyped
program does not evaluate to some special untypable value are inadequate for
languages like C and Java There are many reasons why programs written in
languages like Java and C may produce runtime errors Invalid class formats
in Java and invalid pointer arithmetic in C are examples A type soundness
theorem should enumerate all the errors that cause a welltyped program to
get stuck abort according to the semantics These are the errors that every
safe implementation must detect One regards the type system as sound if none
of these errors is an error that we expect the type system to detect This is
essentially the traditional view of type soundness as a binary property But a
key point to keep in mind is that whether a given type system is sound really
depends on our expectations of the type system Though it may be clear what we
expect for languages like Standard ML it is less clear for lowerlevel languages
like C and assembler
For example we give a type system for a polymorphic dialect of C in  

The type soundness theorem basically says that executing a welltyped program
either succeeds producing a value of the appropriate type fails to terminate or
gets stuck because of an attempt to

It is interesting to consider what sort of proof would have revealed the problem One
strategy would be to try nding a P	time reduction from compromising the private
key used in a digital signature to executing untrusted code It would also establish
a computational lower bound on executing untrusted code using JDK

Such properties are important in situations where you need guarantees against cer	
tain faults An example is isolating execution behind trust boundaries 

 access a dead address
 access an address with an invalid o set
 read an uninitialized address or
 declare an empty or negativesized array
The rst two errors are due to pointers in the language Now one may expect the
type system to detect the rst error in which case our type system is unsound
However if one believes it is beyond the scope of a type system for C then our
type system is sound Clearly if the list included an error such as an attempt to
apply an integer to an integer then the type system would generally be regarded
as unsound
A better way to look at type soundness is merely as a property about the
executions of programs that the type system says are acceptable This allows us
to compare type systems for a language by comparing their soundness properties
Some may be weaker than others in that they require implementations to check
types at run time in order to remain safe It is also useful for determining whether
a particular language is suitable for some application Some of the errors listed
in a formulation of soundness may be among those that an application cannot
tolerate Further and perhaps most importantly it identies those errors that
an implementation must detect in order to safely implement the semantics For
instance a safe implementation of C should trap any attempt to dereference a
dangling pointer Most C implementations are unsafe in this regard One expects
Java implementations to be safer but despite all the attention to typing and
bytecode verication the current situation is unfortunately not as good as one
might imagine
Consider the Java class in Figure 


The class modies itself by putting
a CONSTANT Utf type tag for x in that part of the constant pool where a
CONSTANT String type tag for x is expected by the ldc load from constant
pool instruction Method exec gets a copy of itself in the form of a bytecode
array The class is well typed yet it aborts with a segmentation violation core
dump in JDK even when Java is run in verify mode Verication of the
modied bytecodes does fail using the verify option of the Java class disassembler
javap One would expect it to also fail for the bytecodes dynamically constructed
in exec leading to a VerifyError when class SelfRef is run Instead we get a
core dump So the JDK implementation of Java is unsafe
Perhaps making class representations available in bytecode form needs to
be reconsidered It becomes quite easy to dynamically construct classes that
are dicult to analyze statically for security guarantees Selfmodifying code in
general makes enforcement of protection constraints dicult if not impossible
Channel command programs in the MIT Compatible TimeSharing System




A bit of history The class stems from an attempt to implement an active network in
Java Active programs migrate among servers that invoke their exec methods An
active program maintains state by modifying its own bytecode representation prior
to being forwarded Yes  its a hack

public class SelfRef implements ActiveProgram 
final String x  aaba
public void execbyte b MyLoader loader throws Exception 
if b  x   CONSTANTString
b  x  set CONSTANTUtf
b  x
b  x
Class classOf  loaderdefineClassb  blength





public static void mainString argv throws Exception 
FileInputStream f  new FileInputStreamSelfRefclass
byte data  new bytefavailable
int c  freaddata




Fig    Type mismatch leading to segmentation violation in Java
 Privacy in a Deterministic Language
Suppose we begin by considering a very simple deterministic programming lan
guage with just variables integervalued expressions assignment conditionals
while loops and sequential composition Programs are executed relative to a
memory that maps variables to integers If a program needs IO then it simply
reads from or writes to some specic variables of the memory Further suppose
that some variables of the memory are considered private while others are public
Every program is free to use all variables of the memory and also knows which
variables are public and which are private
What concerns us is whether some program in this rather anemic language
can always produce in a public variable the contents of a private variable There
are many such programs some more complicated than others
For instance one can simply assign a private variable to a public one not a
terribly clever strategy for a hacker This is an example of an explicit channel
Or one might try to do it more indirectly one bit at a time as in Figure  where
PIN is private y is public and the value of mask is a power of two This is an
example of an implicit channel  It illustrates the kind of program we wish to
reject because it does not respect the privacy of PIN We need to formalize the
security property it violates

while mask   
if PIN  mask     bitwise and
y  y  mask  bitwise or

mask  mask  

Fig    Implicit channel
  Privacy Properties
We give a more formal statement of the privacy property we want programs to
have in this simple deterministic language
Denition Termination Security Suppose that c is a command and   and
 are memories that agree on all public variables If     c  
 







agree on all public variables
The judgment     c   
 
asserts that executing command c in initial mem
ory   terminates successfully yielding nal memory  
 
 Intuitively Termination
Security says that we can change the contents of private variables without in
uencing the outcome of public variables In other words these changes cannot
interfere with the nal contents of public variables The above program does not
have this property Any change in the private PIN will result in a di erent nal
value for the public variable y
Is the Termination Security property an acceptable privacy property for pro
grams in our simple deterministic language That depends on what is observable
Consider the similar program in Figure  If one can repeatedly run this program
while PIN  mask    
y  y  mask
Fig    Channel from nontermination
with a di erent mask one for each bit of PIN then assuming y is initially zero
the runs will copy PIN to y One PIN bit is leaked to y in a single run We assume
that after a specic period of time if a run has not terminated then it never
will and we move on to the next bit

But although the program seems insecure it satises Termination Security
Changes to PIN cannot inuence the outcome of y in a single run of the program
After changing the PIN the program may no longer terminate but this does not
violate Termination Security since it only applies to successful termination
Consider another property

The task obviously becomes much easier when we enrich the language with threads
and a clock Now each bit can be examined by an asynchronously	running thread 
and after some timeout we can be fairly condent that all nonzero bits have been
properly set in y
	
Denition Oine Security Suppose that c is a command and   and  are
memories that agree on all public variables If     c   
 
 then there is a 
 






agree on all public variables
Notice that we have removed one of the two successful evaluation hypotheses
from Termination Security The property basically says that changing private
variables cannot interfere with the nal contents of public variables nor can
it interfere with whether a program terminates We call the property Oine
Security because it addresses only what one can observe about a programs
behavior if it is executed oine or in batch mode one either sees the results of
a successful execution or is notied of some timeout that was reached The time
it takes for a program to terminate is not observed In a deterministic language
Oine Security implies Termination Security Actually the formulation of Oine
Security is suitable for treating nondeterminism as we shall see The program in
Figure  does not satisfy Oine Security
Unfortunately there are other sources of channels Consider the program
in Figure  Again suppose we can repeatedly execute it with di erent masks
if   PIN  mask  
y  y  mask
Fig    Channel from partial operation
It always terminates sometimes abnormally from division by zero The e ect
however will be the same to copy PIN to y one bit at a time
Hence if we include partial operations like division we have a situation where
a program might either get stuck terminate abnormally or run forever depend
ing on a private variable So we need yet a stronger oine security property Ba
sically it needs to extend Oine Security with the condition that if c terminates
abnormally under   then it does so under  as well 
None of the preceding properties addresses any di erence in the time required
to run a program under two memories that can disagree on private variables
These di erences can be used to deduce values of private variables in timing
attacks on cryptographic algorithms For example a private key used in RSA
modular exponentiation has been deduced in this fashion 
 Di erences in tim
ing under two memories can be ruled out by requiring that executions under the
two memories proceed in lock step a form of strong bisimilarity This property
which might be called Online Security is the most restrictive thus far But is it
really necessary for mobile programs That depends on what is observable
 What is Observable
Key to judging whether any of the preceding properties is necessary is deter
mining what is observable in the model Whether a privacy property is suitable
depends on how it treats observable events Notice that there is an observation

being exploited in the preceding examples even within a single run that allows
one PIN bit to be leaked to y It arises due to the synchrony of sequential compo
sition Termination Security does not take this kind of observation into account
which makes Oine Security a better choice Recall that Oine Security does
not account for timing di erences but does this matter with mobile code The
key question is who observes the clock
One can imagine examples in languages like Java where a downloaded applet
begins by sending a startup message back to a server on the originating machine
and then ends with a nish message Each message is timestamped by the server
which observes a clock external to the applet We can model this sort of behav
ior in our simple deterministic language by adding a clock in order to record
timestamps on values output to memory Then clock observation is internal
to mobile code This is how UDPTCP ports should really be modeled because
a UDP or TCP servers clock is observed by a client applet when it sends a
TCP segment or UDP message This brings us to our oine assumption
In a mobile code setting the only observable events are those that can be
observed internally that is from within a mobile program using primi
tives of the language
So the Online Security property may be overly restrictive for mobile programs
written in our simple deterministic sequential language
Generally the more a program can observe the more opportunity there is
for leaking secrets As we have seen opportunities can arise with the most basic
primitives for instance synchronous operations
 Nondeterminism and Privacy
Now suppose we introduce nondeterminism via a simple concurrent language It
is a multithreaded imperative language based on the o model of concurrency
 As before we have commands and their sequential composition A thread
is a command that belongs to a thread pool called an object pool in o
A thread pool O maps thread identiers to threads Threads communicate via
shared variables of a global memory A thread pool executes in one step to
a new thread pool by nondeterministically selecting a thread and executing it
sequentially in one step More precisely thread pool transitions are governed by


























Thread pool transitions are denoted
g
 global transitions and sequential tran
sitions
s
 The rst rule treats thread completion and the second treats thread
continuation Intuitively the rst rule says that if we can pick some thread com
mand  from pool O and execute it sequentially for one step in the shared

memory   leaving a memory  
 
 then the entire thread pool O can execute in
one step to a pool where  is gone and the shared memory is now  
 
 The second
rule treats the case where  does not complete but rather is transformed into
a continuation command c
 
that represents what remains of c to be executed
after it executes for only one step Note that no thread scheduling policy is
specied in these rules
With threads come new ways to cleverly leak secrets Programs that appear
harmless can contain subtle channels for transmitting secrets even in this very
basic concurrent language To illustrate we consider a system introduced by
Fine  It is analyzed in  where it is concluded that the system is secure in
the sense that it is not possible for a highlevel subject to pass information to a
lowlevel subject The system consists of two private variables A and B whose
di erence is public and stored in Y As a multithreaded program the system
is given in Figure 

Thread  corresponds to a highlevel user updating the
Thread   
B  B 	 A  v
A  v
Thread  
Y  B 	 A
Fig    The AB system
system with some value v that can be recovered through A Thread  corresponds
to a lowlevel user reading public information from the system The threads share
variables A and B Imagine each of these threads being executed repeatedly and
that v is a constant input parameter The claim is that  cannot transmit any
information to  since  always sees only B  A But this requires that  be
atomic for suppose A and B have initial values a and b respectively If we execute
the rst assignment of  followed by the assignment in  then Y becomes B  a
which is b  a  v  a Since Y is initially b  a we know v  a the di erence
between two successive values input by  So  can observe a di erence controlled
by  The interleaving might be frequent in a real implementation if v is large
What kind of privacy property would rule out this sort of threaded program
First we have to rule out any analog to the Termination Security property be
cause it applies to deterministic programs only Instead suppose we ask whether
the outcomes of public variables can be preserved under changes to private
variables So in the example above we consider an execution that leaves Y equal
to b  a  v  a say for v  a Now we ask whether this outcome is possible
when v is changed to a di erent value say w No matter how we interleave Y
ends up being b  a or b  a  w  a The outcome is no longer possible We
have then the following property 

We ignore a third thread for low	level writing to the system

Denition Possibilistic NI Suppose   and  are memories that agree on



















agree on all public variables
It is a kind of noninterference NI property that closely resembles Suther
lands notion of Nondeducibility on inputs  Also notice the similarity between
this property and Oine Security
The program in Figure  does not satisfy Possibilistic NI Another interesting
example that does not satisfy Possibilistic NI is given in  It uses a main
thread and two triggered threads each with a busywait loop implementing a
semaphore to copy every bit of a private PIN to a public variable In fact the
program always produces a copy of the PIN in a public variable whenever thread
scheduling is fair every thread is scheduled innitely often
Practical extensions of our simple concurrent language make it easy to con
struct multithreaded programs that violate Possibilistic NI For example simple
programs have the property until a scheduling policy like roundrobin time slic
ing is introduced  Adding a clock even without threading leads to simple
programs that fail to have the property The same is true in the presence of
thread priorities and preemption So the outlook for guaranteeing this property
in practical programs written in languages like Java appears bleak
If a multithreaded program satises Possibilistic NI then changes to private
variables cannot interfere with the possibility of public variables having a certain
outcome But the changes may interfere with the probability of that outcome
If so there is a probabilistic channel Consider for instance the program in







Fig    A probabilistic channel
have an equal probability of being scheduled Is the program secure Well it
satises Possibilistic NI so it cannot reveal X with certainty But it is likely to
reveal X Suppose X is  Then the probability that Y has nal value  is 

When X is  however the probability that Y has nal value  drops to  In
e ect the private variable interferes with the probability that Y has nal value 
This kind of interference Gray calls probabilistic interference 
 He describes a
property called Prestrictiveness that aims to rule it out in systems The property
can be viewed as a form of probabilistic noninterference  
 Logics and Static Analyses for Privacy
From the discussion thus far it would appear that a privacy property is de
veloped independently of any logic for reasoning about it While this has been


generally true of security properties studied for computer systems it is usually
not so for programming languages Typically one starts with an intuitive idea of
secure code and gives some sort of logic to capture the notion The next step is to
make the intuition precise so that the logic can be proved sound

To illustrate
we sketch a logic for reasoning about privacy below It is actually a type system
utilizing subtypes A complete description can be found in  where it is proved
that every welltyped deterministic program satises Termination Security
We take security classes like L low or public and H high or private as
our basic types which we denote by   Some typing rules treat explicit channels
and others implicit channels Below is the typing rule for an assignment x  e
	   x   acc 	   e  
	   x  e   cmd

In order for the assignment to be well typed it must be that
 x is a variable of type  acceptor meaning x is capable of storing informa
tion at security level   and
 expression e has type   meaning every variable in e has type  

Information about x is provided by 	 which maps identiers to types So the
rule states that in order for the assignment x  e to be judged secure x must
be a variable that stores information at the same security level as e If this is
true then the rule allows us to ascribe type  cmd to the entire assignment
command The command type  cmd tells us that every variable assigned to by
the command here only x can accept information of security level  or higher
These command types are needed to control implicit channels like the one in
Figure  For example here is the typing rule for conditionals


















execute in a context where information about the
value of e is implicitly availablewhen c
 
executes the value of e was true and
when c






not transmit any information to variables of security level lower than   This is




to have type  cmd 
Here is the typing rule for while loops
	   e  
	   c   cmd
	   while e do c   cmd


Unfortunately  it is quite common to see either the logic skipped entirely  in favor of
an algorithm that implements ones intuition  or soundness not treated adequately 
if at all It is important to make intuitions about security precise

Keep in mind that unlike type preservation  an expression of type  here does not
mean one that evaluates to a value of type   Values in our case integers have no
intrinsic security levels














The typing rules for expressions and commands simply require all subexpres
sions and subcommands to be typed at the same security level For example we
require in rule  that the left and right sides of an assignment be typed at
the same level A similar requirement is imposed in rule 
 Yet we do want to
allow upward information ows such as from public to private But the typing
rules can remain simple because upward ows can be accommodated naturally
through subtyping For example we would have L  H  but not H  L The
subtype relation can naturally be extended with subtype inclusions among types
of the form  cmd and  acc The type constructors cmd and acc are antimono














Intuitively antimonotonicity merely reects the fact that a reader capable of
reading at one security level is capable of reading at a lower level
Also there are two coercions associated with variables If x   var  then x  
and also x   acc That is variables are both expressions and acceptors So if
	x  H var and 	y  L var
then there is an explicit upward ow from y to x in x  y The assignment can
be typed in two ways We can type the assignment with x  H acc by coercing
the type of y to H  or we can type the assignment with y  L by coercing the
type of x to L acc through the antimonotonicity of acceptor types
Now properties of the type system can be proved For example there are
typetheoretic analogs of the wellknown simple security property and property




Lemma Type Analog of Simple Security If 	   e    then for every variable
x in expression e 	   x   
Lemma Type Analog of Connement If 	   c   cmd  then for every variable
x assigned to in command c 	   x   acc
Intuitively Simple Security guarantees no read up in expressions whereas
Connement ensures no write down in commands For example Simple Se
curity ensures that if an expression has type L then it contains no variables
of type H var  Likewise Connement guarantees that if a command has type
H cmd  then it contains no assignments to variables of type L var 
With these two properties one can now prove that every welltyped program
in our simple deterministic language satises Termination Security  The
type system is not limited to privacy One can also introduce integrity classes T

trusted and U untrusted such that T  U  Now if a program satises Ter
mination Security then no trusted variable can be contaminated by untrusted
variables 
To achieve stronger security properties such as Oine Security it is necessary
to restrict the typing of while loops Intuitively a while loop can transmit
information not only by assigning to variables but also by terminating or failing
to terminate This idea was exploited by the program in Figure  To prevent
such ows one can restrict rule  to the following
	   e  L
	   c  L cmd
	   while e do c  L cmd

With this stricter rule one can show that every welltyped program satises
Oine Security  By restricting the typing of partial operations like division
it is also shown in  that welltyped programs satisfy a stronger oine security
property that addresses aborted executions as well as nontermination Finally
under rule  it can be shown that every welltyped concurrent program satises
Possibilistic NI 
An advantage of the type system is that it a ords type inference Procedures
are polymorphic with respect to security classes Principal types are constrained
type schemes that convey how code can be used without violating privacy 
Notice that type checking here is not merely an optimization in that it replaces
runtime checks as in traditional type checking Dennings early work on pro
gram certication and the lattice model over 
 years ago  showed that one
cannot rely only on runtime mechanisms to enforce secure information ow a
direction that had been pursued by Fenton  Static analysis is needed to reveal
implicit channels like the one in Figure 
There is still some question about how the type system should be deployed in
a mobile code setting Currently we are exploring its use in a code certication
pipeline aimed at certifying the security of ecommerce applications written in
Java But we can also imagine the need for analyzing some lowerlevel inter
mediate language like Java virtual machine instructions The loss of program
structure at this level would likely make it more dicult to specify a simple type
system for privacy
  Decidability
The type system above is decidable A type inference algorithm is given for it in
 A desirable property of any logic for reasoning about privacy is that it be
decidable However there is often tension between decidability soundness and
completeness in such logics One is naturally unwilling to compromise soundness
so that can mean having to give up completeness for decidability
For instance the problem of deciding whether a program written in our
simple deterministic language of Section  has the Termination Security prop
erty is not recursively enumerable This means that any sound and recursively

enumerable logic for reasoning about Termination Security must be incomplete
Now the question is how much have we lost by conceding incompleteness There
must be examples of code that have some desired security property but which
cannot be proved in the logic For example here is a snippet of code in our
sequential language that satises Termination Security yet is untypable in the
system above if X is private and Y is public
X  Y
Y  X
Further thread  in the program of Figure  is also untypable The question of
how much has been lost often depends on whether such examples arise frequently
in practice If they do then the logic may yield too many false positives for it
to be practical This has been a primary criticism of informationow checkers
for some time 
 Conclusion
We have explored the relationship between some aspects of language design and
security issues The issues we considered in this paper namely type safety and
privacy are really independent of code mobility Nonetheless the prospect of
migrating code that executes nancial transactions or extends the functionality
of a network switch makes them relevant
So what sort of advice can we o er designers of secure languages First
security should not be viewed as a programming language graft The literature
is lled with attempts that treat security this way Languages have a fundamental
role in secure computation and should be designed with this in mind A designer
might begin by establishing the security properties of interest for a language and
then attempt to introduce functionality while preserving them This seems more
promising than treating security afterward Also one cannot overemphasize the
need for a formal semantics It is essential for proving soundness and basic safety
properties like those in 

We strongly believe that secure languages should have simple compositional
logics for reasoning about the security properties of interest Compilers should
be able to incorporate decision procedures for these logics as static analyses that
programmers can easily understand For instance the type system of Section 
is simple and has an ecient type inference algorithm for inferring type schemes
that convey how programs can be used securely
As far as privacy properties go one has to know what is observable and
how it can be observed There are some known pitfalls In a concurrent set
ting beware of any ability to modulate one thread with another for instance
through a semaphore  Timesliced thread scheduling is also problematic It
does not preserve the Possibilistic NI security property in languages like Java
Java threading and its many features make it easy to build covert timing chan
nels This suggests that it is unsuitable for secure ecommerce applications The
subset Java Card 
 proposed for smartcards may be better since it has no

threading and supports the notion of a transaction 	 Designing a secure con
current language that is exible and admits simple and accurate static analyses
is the subject of current research
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